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NOTE

LESSONS TO BE LEARNED: THE CONFLICT IN
INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST LAW
CONTRASTED WITH PROGRESS IN
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW
William P. Connolly*
INTRODUCTION

The international community has varying approaches to the
divergent fields of antitrust law and financial law. These numerous
approaches are either procedural or substantive. ' Nations adopt
rules based on their specific common law and their policy on trade
As a result, when principles of law and the ideologies of politicians
and economists in different countries conflict, monopolists and
securities law violators can escape the grasp of enforcement
agencies.
International antitrust law, however, involves a different set of
regulations and regulatory agencies than international financial
* ID. Candidate, 2002, Fordham University School of Law. This Note is
dedicated in memory of my father, William J. Connolly, a model for what ethical
and successful attorneys should be.
1. See generally Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalizationof Antitrust
Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. Rev. 343, 400-01 (1997) (arguing that, in the field of
international antitrust law, procedural and substantive issues follow similar
patterns because they are interconnected).
Z See Spencer Weber Waller, The Decline of the Nation State and Its Effect
on Constitutionaland InternationalEconomic Law: Contribution:NationalLmvs
and InternationalMarkets: Strategies of Cooperationand Harmonizationin the
Enforcement of Competition Law, 18 CARDOZO L REV. 1111, 1122 (1996)
(discussing the competing ideologies of the United States Trade Representative
office and the European Commission, the former advocating using antitrust to
resolve trade disputes and protect American companies and the latter pursuing
efforts to harmonize international antitrust law).
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law. U.S. corporations that engage in international business
demand that the major domestic antitrust authorities, the Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Department of Justice
("DOJ"), increase measures to end anticompetitive behavior by

foreign companies in foreign nations that effects U.S. profits from
international trade. ' Both agencies, however, maintain that they
apply American antitrust law based on what is efficient and fair for
our economy and the global economy. ' Yet, others contend that
the agencies are often vehicles for the expansion of American

trade and products into foreign markets.

S

The result of these competing interests is multiple policies,
which in turn produce multiple statutes and antitrust guidelines
that the DOJ and FTC must enforce. On one end of the spectrum
is the principle of extraterritorial action, where the U.S. courts or
agencies reach out and punish violators of U.S. antitrust law who

are located in other nations. If anticompetitive behavior affects the
U.S. economy, regardless of whether the act occurred outside the
U.S. or involved foreign nationals, U.S. courts can exercise subject
matter jurisdiction. 6 The modem reflection of this idea, the
"effects" doctrine, 7 is embodied in the 1995 Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations ("Guidelines"), ' a joint

3. See American Bar Association, Recommendation and Report on the
Application of Competition Law and Principlesand Policies in the International
Trade Area, 29 INT'L L. 945 (1995).
4. See Prepared Statement of Joel I Klein, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, U.S. Departmentof Justice,Before the House Committee on the
Judiciary,FED. NEws SERvIcE, Apr. 12,2000 [hereinafter Prepared Statement of
Joel I. Klein] (stating the U.S. reluctance to accepting foreign procedural law due
to a lack of enforcement by foreign agencies). The Bush Administration
appointees have yet to explain their position on procedural antitrust law as of the
final draft of this Note.
5. See, e.g., Robert Rice, Rebuff for U.S. over Antitrust Stance - Draft
Guidelines on Jurisdiction Outside the Country are Unpopular with Other
Governments, FIN. TIMES (London), Mar. 7, 1995, at 12.
6. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa"), 148 F.2d 416,444
(2d Cir. 1945) (on cert. from United States Supreme Court due to lack of

quorum).
7. Id.
8. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (Guidelines), Apr. 5,1995.
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creation of the FTC and DOJ.
The opposite view, regarding antitrust law, is grounded in the

principle of comity. This concept aims at recognizing the
sovereignty of other nations' systems of law and balances those
laws against the rights of one's own nation. 9 Such cooperation has

resulted in the creation of Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties
("MLATs"), which focus on criminal law enforcement in general,
whether it be over antitrust violations or penal law violations. "
These treaties allow two or more nations to share investigative
information through provisions outlining modes of requesting and
delivering evidence

and witnesses between two nations.

"

Unfortunately, in most countries, antitrust violations fall under
civil law, not criminal law, and thus are not under the purview of
MLATs. ' The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance
Act ('IAEAA")' was designed to remedy this situation by
negotiating bilateral treaties between other nations that provide
for reciprocal assistance on antitrust matters. "
The goals of extraterritorial action and cooperation are clearly
at odds. Yet, the FTC and DOJ practice both daily while looldng

at the international community with a straight face.

As one

commentator asserted, cooperation is the "velvet glove,"
emphasizing reason, if not harmonization, of enforcement. " If a
9. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1S95); see also Laker Airways
Ltd. v. Sabena, 731 F.2d 909,937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
10. See Charles S. Stark, Jurisdiction and Enforcement: International
Cooperationin the Pursuitof Cartels, 6. GEo. MASON L REv. 533, 537 (1993)
(explaining past prosecution efforts between the U.S. and Canada, the U.S. and
European Union, as well as the substantive laws used between nations to
prosecute cartels).
L I&
12. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 103d
Congress, 2d Session, 103 H. Rpt. 772 (an example of a nation where antitrust
matters do not fall under the purview of the criminal law is Japan).
13. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994 § 1-13; 15
U.S.C. § 6201-12 (2000).
14. See generally Laraine L. Laudati and Todd J. Friedbacher, Trading
Secrets - The InternationalAntitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, 16 N. I ='L
L. & Bus. 478, 479 (1995) (providing a comprehensive explanation of each
section of the IAEAA and the immediate events leading up to it).
15. See Joseph P. Griffin, Sovereignty Revisited. Regulation of Competitionin
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nation fails to conform to the United States' procedural tactics, the
iron fist of extraterritorial action will smash the laws of the nation,
come and get a violator wherever he or she resides, put them in
prison or bankrupt the nation's valuable company. ' The approach
is inconsistent and threatening. Foreign nations have responded

negatively by ignoring pleas for cooperation, even blocking U.S.
attempts at securing information.7

Regulation of financial law, in comparison, has taken a
decidedly different path. Financial risks and practices are now
often pooled together, especially within the same company, and

those practices stretch across many borders. "8Rapid innovation in
products and services across borders is met by strict regulations. "
This globalization has to lead to increased and more efficient

communication, cooperation, and coordination among bank
supervisors and securities regulators on an international basis. ,
"Functional regulation" is the phrase associated with an
international convergence of regulatory and supervisory standards

the Canada/U.S. Context, ExtraterritorialReach of U.S. Antitrust Law - A U.S.
Perspective, 24 CAN-U.S. L.J. 315 (1998) (showing the unlikelihood of an
international antitrust code in light of the U.S. desire to exercise its laws,
extraterritorially, at will).
16. Id.
17. See Seung Wha Chang, ExtraterritorialApplication of U.S. Antitrust Laws
to Other Pacific Countries: Proposed Bilateral Agreements for Resolving
International Conflicts within the Pacific Community, 16 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMP. L. REv. 295, 298-302 (1993) (explaining various types of statutes that
block U.S. attempts at discovery and judgment in Canada, Korea, Japan, and
Australia- so-called "blocking statutes").
1& See Joseph J. Norton, Tribute: "International Financial Law," An
Increasingly Important Component of "InternationalEconomic Law": A Tribute
to Professor John H. Jackson, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 133, 138-139 (1999)
(describing the development of international financial law, especially in light of
the emergence of international regulatory bodies in securities regulation, banking
law, disclosure of corporate and financial documents, and insider trading).
19. See generally JOHN H. JACKSON, REGULATORY INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC BEHAVIORS - REFLECrIONS ON THE BORDER SETrINGS OF
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS, IN EMERGING
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE ROLE OF
ORGANIZATIONS, 3 (J.J. Norton and M. Andenas

20.

Norton, supra note 18, at 140.

INTERNATIONAL

eds. 1996).

FINANCIAL
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of nations, governing securities firms and banks. , Domestic
regulatory agencies (most notably in the U.S., the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC")) often act independently of their
government and with private actors through Memoranda of
Understanding ("MOU"), a tool similar to an antitrust MLAT. '
In some fields of international law, the convergence toward
international standards has already begun, while in others, it has
been delayed by claims of sovereignty and power. The territorial
model of sovereignty is becoming an elastic notion of jurisdiction
based on effects on different nations, not just the place of
conduct.3 Two approaches have been taken to harmonize security
markets: cooperation and reciprocity. 2" It must be noted that
although these approaches are recognized in international antitrust
law as well, that field has not yet realized the goal of harmonization
of procedural and substantive standards. Cooperation in the
financial field of disclosure, for example, attempts to find a
common set of regulations, especially a standardized disclosure
statement. ' Reciprocity, another tool, seeks mutual recognition
by one country of another's set of documents or laws in return for
the second country meeting minimum standards. ' Since there are
no international regulators in most financial fields, harmonization
through reciprocity might be easier to achieve-reluctant nations
like the U.S. are compelled to accept one nation's standards at a
time through this model, instead of a set of standards for dealing

21. Id.
22. See Kanishka Jayasuriya, The Rule of Law in the Era of Globalization,6
IND. I. GLOBALLEG. STUD. 425,429 (1999) (discussing the validity of MOUs and
MLATs in establishing clear rules for multinational corporations concerned with

dealing with multiple regulators in the fields of securities regulation and
banking).
23. I1.
24. See Marc I. Steinberg and Lee E. Michaels, Disclosure in Global
Securities Offerings: Analysis of JurisdictionalApproaches, Commonality and

Reciprocity,, 20 M cHi. J.INT'L L. 207, 236 (1999) (analyzing the opinions of
international advisory bodies, and how nations have positively responded to
these proposals, leading toward recent reciprocall'progressive" agreements).
25. See Manning Gilbert Warren, Harmonization of Securities Laws: The
Achievements of the EuropeanCommunities,31 HARV.INT'LLJ. 155,191 (1999).
26. Id.
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with all nations. 2' However, if the U.S. ignores the goal of
harmonization when joining into reciprocal or cooperative
agreements, whether financial or antitrust, the agreements are
moot.
The validity and worth of the IAEAA, a reciprocal antitrust
agreement, must be questioned in this climate. Indeed, on the day
President Clinton signed the IAEAA into law, Japanese
governmental officials revealed they had no intention of sharing
information with the U.S. pursuant to the IAEAA. ' Is the
IAEAA a valued tool in the grand strategy of U.S. international
antitrust policy, as the FTC and DOJ now argue it to be, " or is it
merely a ploy to satiate the international community while the U.S.
continues to refuse to agree on reforming our substantive and
procedural law to reconcile with international concerns? Further,
has the U.S. followed a similar path of capitulation in international
financial law, or have real strides been made toward harmonization
in that field? Unless harmonization on international procedural
and substantive antitrust law can begin, the IAEAA may be a
largely ineffective act with no real chance of international
acceptance and is merely another piece of aggressive U.S.
international trade policy.
The lesson learned from the
development of international financial law over the last few
decades could provide resolution to this debate.
This Note contrasts the conflict between the United States'
two divergent policies on international antitrust law, and how the
policies cannot be reconciled, with our relatively progressive move
toward harmonization in international financial law. Part I sets
forth the status of international antitrust law prior to the IAEAA,
and then examines the provisions of the IAEAA and the 1995
Guidelines. This is followed by a brief examination of four major
areas of international financial law: securities regulation, banking
law, insider trading, and disclosure. Part II examines the conflict
the Guidelines and the IAEAA create internationally, as
compared to similar conflicts and dissimilar resolutions in
international financial law. Part III argues that the IAEAA was
27.
28.
29.

Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 24, at 237.
Japan May Resist U.S. Overtures,Bus. L. EUR., Nov. 2,1995.
Prepared Statement of Joel I. Klein, supra note 4.
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unlikely to succeed from the start, and that the FTC and DOJ
either ignore or readjust their views on its practical use.
Agreements in most financial areas, most notably disclosure, where
reciprocal agreements are now encouraged by the U.S., are
generally and necessarily moving toward harmonization. It also
suggests that a move towards harmonization on specifics of
antitrust law could prevent further damage.
I. THE IAEAA AND THE 1995 GUIDELINES AS THE PRODUCT Of
ACENTURY OF SHERiAN ACT JURISDICTION, IN COMPARISON To
THE CONSTANTLY EVOLVING STATE OF INTERNATIONAL
FINANCIAL LAW
A. The State Of InternatinnalAntitrust Law
The IAEAA is the latest in a century's worth of U.S.
involvement in international antitrust law, dating back to initial
applications of the Sherman Act. The extent to which Sherman
Act jurisdiction should apply internationally, both procedurally
and substantively, still has not been settled. In the early 20
Century, few nations, including developed Eastern European
countries, had antitrust laws, and those who did were not vigilant in
prosecuting overseas cases. "1The U.S. gained procedural direction
with a justification for the extraterritorial doctrine in 1945 with
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America ("Alcoa").
That
rationale is known as the "intended effects doctrine." ' In Alcoa,
the Second Circuit held that U.S. courts and agencies could assert
claims against conduct occurring outside their borders as long as
the act intended to effect and did affect U.S. commerce. ' The
Supreme Court refined this approach to extraterritorial action in

30.
31.

26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7).
Stark, supranote 10, at 536.
32. 148 F.2d 416,444 (2d Cir. 1945).
33. Id.
34. "[Ilt is settled law.. .that any state may impose liabilities, even upon
persons not vthin its border which the state reprehends; and these liabilities
other states will normally recognize." Id.
at 443-44.
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HartfordFireInsurance Co. v. California." International comity, a
valid defense up until HartfordFire, was devalued when the Court
ruled that any substantial effect on U.S. commerce outweighed
comity absent a "true conflict" with another nation's law?6
Foreign nations balked at the effects doctrine on procedural
and substantive grounds. The extraterritorial approach allows U.S.
courts to expand their jurisdiction by finding that a wide range of
conduct has a substantial effect on U.S. commerce. ' Further,
through applying U.S. substantive law to foreign companies and
nations, foreign nationals have been prosecuted for violations of
U.S. law-even when the foreign nation that companies are located
in do not even recognize those violations as crimes. 38
International antitrust cooperation agreements were few and
far between after Alcoa. "' Most arrangements consisted of the
U.S. fighting to stop a cartel hurting domestic companies' ability to
penetrate foreign markets; in turn, the nation wherein the cartel
was located demanded concessions for aid in that fight. , The U.S.
refused these demands, instead pushing forward the policy of
extraterritoriality. ' Soon after Alcoa, the U.S. pursued many
international cartels and vertical restraints, notably involving
former Axis powers that excluded U.S. business from those
Western European and Japanese markets. , Angered nations
formed blocking statutes as a reaction to assertions of jurisdiction
inside their borders. , Blocking statutes prohibit compliance with
35. 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
36. Id.
37. Chang, supranote 17, at 296.
3& See George W. Haight, InternationalLaw & ExtraterritorialApplication
of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.. 639, 654.
39. See generally Terry Calvani, Business and Law: Long Arm of U.S.
Regulations, FIN. TIMEs (London), Oct. 25, 1994 (analyzing why the U.S. would
implement the Guidelines if other nations have always fumed over such an
extraterritorial approach).
40. Stark, supra note 10.
41. Id.
42. Waller, supranote 2.
43. Gary E. Dyal, Comment, The Canada-United States Memorandum of
UnderstandingRegardingApplication of NationalAntitrust Law: New Guidelines
for Resolution of MultinationalAntitrust Enforcement Disputes, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 1065, 1081 (1984-85).
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U.S. court order, verdicts, and FTC and DOJ investigative
requests. 4 "Claw-back" provisions, allowing for actions to reduce
damages awarded by U.S. courts, respond to the treble damages
awarded under U.S. antitrust law. "
At the same time, the U.S. fostered the seeds of cooperation
with some nations. The earliest sign, the "Fulton-Rogers
Understanding," an oral agreement between the U.S. and Canada,
allowed the two nations to notify each other whenever one would
engage in an investigation which might hurt the other's interests. "
A formal Memorandum of Understanding was negotiated between
the two nations in 1984, ensuring that the U.S. would take comity
into its analysis when starting an investigation, in return for
Canada limiting the use of its blocking statues. ' The real
breakthrough, however, occurred one year later with the 1985
MLAT between the U.S. and Canada, which included antitrust as
one of the areas of criminal law where the parties would assist each
other in investigative matters. " This MLAT has been successful in
cross-border investigations of the thermal fax paper industry ' and
the plastic dinnerware industry. '
Another major antitrust agreement occurred in 1991 between
the U.S. and the European Union. " It included provisions on
notification, consultation, comity, and even coordination of
efforts. An example of the results of that agreement occurred in
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id.
See Chang,supranote 17 and accompanying text.
Stark, supranote 10.
See Memorandum of Understanding as to Notification, Consultation and

Cooperationwith respect to the Application of NationalAntitrust Laws, U.S.-Can.,

Mar. 9,1984,23 I.L.M. 275 (1984).
48. Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, U.S.-Can., Mar.
18,1985,24 .L.ML 1092 (1935).
49.

See U.S. and Canadian ProsecutorsAttack Cartel BehaviorBy Fax Paper

Distributors,67 ANTrrRUsT & TRADEREG. R.P. (BNA) 108 (1994).
50. See Plastic Dinnerware Price Fxing Probe Nets Indictment, Guilty Plea
Arrangements, 66 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP (BNA) 661 (1994).
51. See Agreement Between the Government of the United States of
America and the Commission of the European Communities Regarding the
Application of Their Competition Laws, reprintedin 4 TRADE REG REP. (CCH)
para. 13.504 (Sept. 23,1991).
52. Stark, supranote 10.
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1994, when the DOJ and the European Commission (EC)
concluded a successful joint investigation of Microsoft. 3 The two
parties have split, however, on the goals of international antitrust
law. , The U.S. usually supports cooperation proposals from the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
("OECD"), which was founded in part by the U.S. after World
War II to help implement the Marshall Plan. ' OECD's most
recent recommendation seeks a framework for international
cooperation and enforcement, but no set code for conduct or
enforcement. 5 The EU, recognizing that OECD proposals still
allow for extraterritorial action at the U.S.'s whim, works mainly
through the World Trade Organization (WTO) to establish an
international code for some antitrust violations. 5
Some courts recognized the EU and the WTO's position and
attempted to soften the U.S. approach. The Ninth Circuit, in
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America ("Timberlane"), 58
formed the "jurisdictional rule of reason" test, a multi-factor
balancing test for determining jurisdiction. 9 Judge Raymond
Choy, writing for the majority, pointedly rejected the effects
doctrine. ' He drew upon factors outlined in the Restatement
53.

See Microsoft Settles Accusations of Monopolistic Selling Practices, 67
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 106 (July 21,1994).
54. See generally Dominic Bencivenga, International Antitrust: Nations
Respond to GreaterNeed for Cooperation,N.Y.L.J., Oct. 23, 1997 (discussing the
ANTITRUST

difference in the OECD and WTO approaches). The OECD is a consortium of
nations, both from the Americas and Asia, which meet (at least) annually to

propose measures member nations can use to combat anticompetitive activities
domestically and internationally.

55. Id.
56. See Revised Recommendation of the Council Concerning Cooperation
Between Member Countries on Anticompetitive Practices Affecting
International Trade, OECD Doc. C(95) 130/final (July 27 & 28, 1995), available
in 35 I.L.M. 1314 (1995) (recommending "notification, exchange of information,
co-ordination of action, consultation and conciliation" on a voluntary basis).
57. Stark, supranote 10.
58. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 472 U.S. 1032 (1985).
59. Id. at 613-14.
60. Id. at 611-12 (stating that "the effects test by itself is incomplete because
it fails to consider other nation's interests. Nor does it expressly take into
account the full nature of he relationship between actors and this country.").
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(Second) of the United States Foreign Relation Law
("Restatement") to delineate eight criteria to consider when

weighing comity and sovereignty against whether there was an
injury to a party in the U.S. due to the foreign conduct. " The
factors included, most importantly, the degree of conflict with
foreign policy or law, the extent to which enforcement by either
state can be expected to achieve compliance, the extent to which
there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce,
and the relative weight given said violations within the United
States as compared with the degree of scrutiny attributed to the
violations abroad. 62
However, the Third Circuit ignored the trend towards

recognizing comity when deciding

procedural matters in

Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. ("Mannington
Mills").' The court held the effects doctrine to be the litmus test

for jurisdiction, only factoring in comity considerations after
asserting proper jurisdiction. " Finally, Hartford Fire adhered to
Alcoa's strict effects test. ' It was a five-to-four decision based on
its reading of the Restatement. " Subsequent to the decision, the
author of the Restatement wrote a law journal article where he

claimed
position.'

the

majority

"misunderstood"

the

Restatement's

Justice Scalia, writing for the dissent, advocates a

position similar to Timberlane, " a position which increased in
6L Id. at 613 (stating that "there is the additional question which is unique to
the international setting of whether the interests of, and links to, the United
States - including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce are sufficiently strong, vis-4-vis those of other nations, to justify an assertion of
extraterritorial authority.").
62. Id. at 614 (citing Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States 40).
63. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
64. Id. at 1296 (using the balancing test only after finding jurisdiction).
65. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
66. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
403 (1987) (available on file with the Journal of Corporate & Financial Law).
67. Andrew S. Lowenfeld, Comment, Conflict, Balancingof Interests, and the
Exercise of Jurisdictionto Prescribe:Reflections on the InsuranceAntitrust Case,
89 AM. J. INT'L L. 42 (1995).
6& See HartfordFire Ins., 509 U.S. 764, 818 n.9 (1993) (Scalia, 3., dissenting)
(arguing that comity should be addressed during, not after, a jurisdictional
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validity after the U.S. cooperative effort with Canada.
Despite these considerations and the strong conflict between
circuits and inside the Supreme Court itself, the FTC and DOJ
pressed Congress for cooperative treaties to help in investigations,
because in an expanding economy, more information is often
found abroad. 70 The problem was that MLATs only works with
nations that include antitrust violations as crimes; further, they are
usually created for only one situation. " In the U.S. and in some
other nations, cooperation in civil matters is limited by strict
confidentiality and disclosure rules. ' The agencies sought a
vehicle for gathering and sharing confidential material, thereby
getting the requests for information past blocking statutes, while
simultaneously safeguarding them from public consumption. "
The two U.S. agencies devised the IAEAA as their solution. 4
The IAEAA entered Congress with the support of both political
parties and the Clinton Administration, was drafted in consultation
with the business community, and passed swiftly through Congress
only ten weeks after its introduction. ' IAEAA provides for
voluntary bilateral cooperation only with nations who have agreed
inquiry).
69. See Stark, supranote 46 and accompanying text.
70. See 140 Cong. Rec. S15021 (1994) (statement of Senator Thurmond) ("It
is appropriate and necessary for our antitrust authorities to be given better tools
for obtaining evidence abroad, because antitrust violations increasingly involve
transactions and evidence which are located abroad or in more than one

country.").
71.

Waller, supranote 2.

72.

Id. For instance, the U.S. cannot disclose materials obtained through

Civil Investigative Demands. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (1996).
73. Waller, supranote 2.
74. See generally News Conference with: Attorney General Janet Reno,
Senator Howard Metzenbaum, Representative Jack Brooks, Assistant Attorney
General Anne Bingham, Introduction of the InternationalAntitrust Enforcement
Assistance Act of 1994, FED. NEws SERVICE, Jun. 13, 1994 [hereinafter News
Conference with Janet Reno] (representing that the Act's purpose is to "facilitate
obtaining foreign-located antitrust evidence by authorizing the Attorney General
of the United States and the Federal Trade Commission to provide, in
accordance with mutual assistance agreements, antitrust evidence to foreign
antitrust authorities on a reciprocal basis.").
75. The InternationalAntitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 4 U.S.
MExico L. J. 169, 175.
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to an antitrust mutual assistance agreement ("AMAA") with the
U.S.7 The agreements require reciprocity, meaning the respective
U.S. agency would offer a certain type of assistance only if the
respective foreign agency offered the same type of assistance. '
The agreements also provide for the protection of confidential
information.78 Specifically, protection accorded to the documents,
those offered by the U.S. to foreign agencies, must be no less than
that provided under U.S. law. " Finally, the public interest must be
satisfied. " The Attorney General can deny a request under an
AMAA, in whole or in part. " If the request is granted, the DOJ
or FTC can either disclose information in their files C"andlor use
their agency to investigate and obtain new evidence for foreign
agencies. '
There are some exceptions to the information the DOJ or FTC
can disclose.
Disclosure of Hart-Scott-Rodino pre-merger
information cannot be disclosed to a foreign authority. '
Moreover, grand jury information must not be disclosed, pursuant
to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), except upon a showing
to a court of a "particularized need." "' Further, the agencies may
still be forced to disclose information if said disclosure is required
by federal law. "
The ability to cooperate increased after the enactment of the
IAEAA, but it was curiously followed less than half a year later by
a restrictive revision of the DOJ and FTC's Guidelines. ' The
76.

See generally15 U.S.C. § 6201 (2000).

77. IAEAA § 3. That reciprocity can be provided "without regard to whether
the conduct investigated violates any of the Federal antitrust laws." See id. § 3(c).
78. Id.§ 8(b). Note that any evidence is exempt from the disclosure
requirements of U.S. law, such as the Freedom of Information Act. See supra
note 12 at 481.
79. IAEAA § 3.
80.

Id § 8 (a)(3) (requiring the "requested antitrust evidence" to be

"consistent with the public interest of the United States.").
81. 1d § 3(a).
82. See id.
§2.
83.
84.

Id. § 3(b).
See id. § 5(1).

85.
86.
87.

See id. § 5(2)(A).
Id. § 8(b).
See U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
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IAEAA is mentioned in only one sentence in the Guidelines,
during a description of attempts at cooperation with foreign
nations. ' The remainder of the sections reaffirm the effects
doctrine and promote an aggressive extraterritorial approach to
implementing that procedure. 9 This direct conflict between the
Guidelines and the IAEAA seems illogical at first glance.
B. ProgressIn InternationalFinancialLaw
Similar conflicts arise in the fields of international financial
law, but in most areas, progress toward harmonization is already in
place. For instance, in securities regulation, the International
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) handles the
transnationalization of the securities markets and makes proposals
on forming a regulatory framework for those markets. o A second
realm is banking law.
Most international standards and
negotiations among banking supervisors have been pursued by the
Basle Committee. "' Insider trading, a third example, has been
handled at times by the IOSCO through recommendations, but by
and large there has been little, if any, international move toward
harmonization. '
Finally, the IOSCO has produced
recommendations on disclosure focusing on minimum standards of
acceptable conduct in order to prevent the creation of unchecked
regulatory competition that could produce a race to the bottom. "
The U.S. recently agreed to a reciprocal disclosure agreement with
Canada in forming the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System

Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations, supra note 8 and
accompanying text.
8& Id at § 2.9-2.92.
89. Ld. at § 3.1-4.22.
90. Sommer, infra note 95 and accompanying text.
91. See Jayasuriya, supra note 22 and accompanying text.
92. See Steinberg & Michaels, supra note 24 at 237; see generally Donald C.
Lanevoort, Cross-BorderInsider Trading (forthcoming 2001) (available on file

with the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law) (arguing a minimum
code of international insider trading law is the most viable intermediate step to
solving the current web of conflicting laws governing the locus of the trade, the
issuer, the broker, and other parties).
93. Steinberg & Michaels, supranote 24, at 237.
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("MJDS").
1. InternationalSecuriiev Regulation
The IOSCO began in 1974 after Western nations organized to
discuss and issue recommendations on securities regulation and
assist in asset capital formulation. " The group brings together
governmental securities regulators, Self-Regulatory Organization
representatives, and private sector members.
The by laws state

that authorities resolve to cooperate to ensure better regulation of
markets through the exchange of information, unified standards
and surveillance of securities transactions, and mutual assistance of

enforcement. '

The IOSCO, however, cannot impose its

recommendations on its members and consensus is often lacking
on key issues. "
Like the WTO does for antitrust law, the IOSCO's ultimate
objective is the harmonization of regulatory standards through
recommendations operating through a system of network
governance.
The members usually come from more ministerial
governmental agencies and not from legislative ones. " Yet, these
actors make the rules and recommendations for securities
regulation which eventually are eventually embraced as
international standards. "Q

94. See Anna Drummond, Securities Law: Internationalizationof Securities
Regulation - MuldtiurisdictionalDisclosure System for Canadaand the U.S., 36
VLL. L. REV. 775,779 (1991).
95. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement, 17 Nw. J.
Int'l L. & Bus. 15,15-16 (1996).
96. See Roberta Karmel, Securities Regulation: The IOSCO Venice
Conference, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 19,1989, at 3.
97. International Organization of Securities Commissions, Preamble to the
By-Laws (available on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial
Law).
98. See I amel, supranote 96.
99. Jayasuriya, supra note 22, at 450.

1O.

Id.

101. See Geoffrey Underhill, Keeping Governments Out of Politics:
Transnational Securities Markets, Regulatory Cooperation, and Political
Legitimacy, 21 REv. INT'LSTUD. 251,273 (1995).
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2. InternationalRegulation Of Banking Law

The Basle Committee on Banking Supervision, another
international regulatory body in financial law, chiefly attempts to
strengthen the supervision of the international banking system by
establishing mutual cooperation between supervisory agencies. "0
To achieve this, the Basle Committee requires these agencies
pursuing
broadly
accepted
guidelines,
not
detailed
harmonization."
For instance, the Basle Accord on capital
adequacy standards was agreed to by central banks to maintain
adequate capital standards, which became of increasing import due
to the integration of the financial services industry. 1 Before these
standards were implemented, in the 1980s, there was a supervisory
vacuum in this new global market. 105 Domestic agencies were still
nationally oriented within their national banking systems."
Regulatory cooperation was driven by the desire to protect
sovereignty while at the same time filling the vacuum. ""However,
the Basle Committee internationalized these banking agencies to a
large extent, thus harming the internal sovereignty of the nations
involved. "
3. Regulation Of InternationalInsider Trading
Cross-border insider trading, on the other hand, is a topic
where law has yet to harmonize and nations are reluctant to
compromise their substantive or procedural law for a set of
standards. Instead, the SEC often seeks MOUs for particular cases
to facilitate investigation, not harmonization. 109 There is no
current SEC policy on when U.S. insider trading rules will be

102. Jayasuriya, supranote 22, at 449.
103. See David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight
Existence of InternationalFinancialRegulatory Organizations,33 TEx. INT'L L.J.
281,289 (1998).
104. Jayasuriya, supra note 22, at 448.
105. See WOLFGANG H. REINCKE, GLOBAL PUBLIC POLICY 104 (1998).
106. Id
107. Id.
108. Jayasuriya, supranote 22, at 448.
109. See generally Langevoort, supra note 92.
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applied extraterritorially. 110 For the SEC, the practice has been to
take the trading site as the strongest factor in asserting
jurisdiction.m The rationale the SEC uses for insider trading could
include the desire to impose a strong fiduciary ethic, a cultural
expression of economic regulation, and/or pure investor
protectionism. " These factors are often dismissed by critics as
simple advertising and public relations moves in favor of U.S.
markets, with no real merit. "
4. IntemationalDiscosvure Rides
International disclosure rules, on the other hand, are moving
toward harmonization. The IOSCO develops many disclosure
recommendations. More importantly, the MJDS between the U.S.
and Canada formed to make disclosure, supervisory, and
enforcement standards so similar that each nation can use the
other's documents without harm to investors. "' Essentially, the
system, from the Canadian perspective, permits U.S. issuers who
meet requirements to make offerings in Canada using disclosure
documents which also satisfy SEC requirements.
The MJDS is
similar to the IAEAA not only in that requires reciprocity, but also
in that harmonization of disclosure standards is not a stated goal. z
II. THE IAEAA AND SIMILAR FINANCIAL LAW POLICIES:
CONCESSIONS OR BREAKTHROUGHS?

The IAEAA was pitched to Congress as an initiative to
protect consumers and businesses at risk from global

110. Id.
111.
112.
113.

Id.
Id.
See Khanna et al., Insider Trading, Outside Seard and Resource

Allocation: Why Frms and Society May Disagreeon Insider TradingRestrictions,
7 REV. FIN. STUD. 575 (1994).
114. See David S. Ruder, Reconciling U.S. DisclosurePolicy with International
Accounting and DisclosureStandards,17 NW. J. INT'LL & Bus. 1,8 (1996).
115. Steinberg & Michaels, supranote 24, at 253.
116. Id. at 265.
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anticompetitive behavior in the international economy. "" At the
same time, it was sold to the international community as a
revolutionary "second generation" agreement, because it included
the sharing of confidential information. "' Yet, the international
community did not know what to make of this breakthrough, given
the strong case law and Guidelines favoring the extraterritorial
approach. ", The two approaches are inconsistent with one
another at first glance. Not surprisingly, international financial law
still faces similar conflicts on the path toward harmonization.
A. The DOJ/FTC:The IAEAA As One Of Many Valuable Tools
Initially, the IAEAA was said to be groundbreaking
legislation. '" Then Assistant Attorney General, Anne Bingham,
claimed it might help eliminate unilateral actions, a policy angering
other nations and thus hurting U.S. diplomatic efforts in various
fields, " One commentator suggested that Canada might be the
first country to sign an AMAA because its MLAT with the U.S.
paralleled so many of the principles set out in the IAEAA. 1
After passage of the IAEAA, the FTC and DOJ sought a broad
network of AMAAs to link prosecutions worldwide, particularly
with the EU, because its member states were one of few groups
with a solid body of domestic antitrust law and a record of tracking
offenders internationally. 1 U.S. officials visited their counterparts
117. See 140 Cong. Rec. H10453 (comments of Representative Hamilton Fish,
one of the bill's co-sponsors in the House of Representatives).
118. Laudati & Friedbacher, supra note 14, at 478.
119. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust
Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations (Guidelines), supra note 8;
see also Norton, supranote 8.
120. News Conference with Attorney General Janet Reno, supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
121. See Hearing on S2297 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies
and Business Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d

Session (1994) (statement of Anne K. Bingaman, Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, Department of Justice).

122.

The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, supra

note 75, at 177.
123. See H.R. Rep. No. 103-772, 103d Cong. 2d Sess., at 14, 26 (Oct. 3, 1994)

(Committee expresses opinion that despite some flux in the "sovereignty
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in Germany, Ireland, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the

United Kingdom to promote the IAEAA and a potential AMAA
with an individual nation or with the EU as a whole. "'
By early 1998, however, no AMAA was in place. The Chief of

the Foreign Commerce Division of the Antitrust Department of
the DOJ, Charles Stark, started characterizing the IAEAA in a less
promising way. 12) Stark noted that the many nations still needed

legislation allowing them to enter into an agreement like the
IAEAA before they could even negotiate a AMAA, and that

might be the reason none had yet been enacted. :

More

importantly, he characterized the IAEAA as one of many options
for pursuing cooperation. 17 The talk of "second generation"

agreements being the next step over antiquated "first-generation"
MLATs and MOUs was conspicuously absent from his
statements.' : Stark concluded by urging the OECD to condemn

cartels and fight them through cooperative means.
On April 27, 1999 a year after Stark's speech, the U.S. and
Australia signed the first (and only to date) AMAA. ' The
AMAA provides fewer tools than the original IAEAA hoped for.

For instance, the party from whom information is requested can
agreements" between the EU and member states, the EU has sovereign authority
to administer and enforce its antitrust lawrs and to prohibit and regulate
disclosure of information obtained in an antitrust investigation, as per IAEAA §
12 (9)); S. Rep. No. 103-3MS, 103d Cong., 2d Sess., at 15 (Sept. 30, 1994)
(Committee argues that the EU is a "regional economic integration
organization" within the definition of IAEAA § 12(9)).
124. Laudati & Friedbacher, supra note 14. at 479.
125. Stark, supranote 10.
126. Id. at 540 (stating "the legislative process is not something that can take
place instantly. We are hopeful that many of our foreign partners vill enact
legislation, and there has been gratifying interest abroad in doing so.").
127 Id. These options included MLATs and MOUs, previously characterized
by DOJ officials as outdated.
129. Id. (stating that -[tlhe IAEAA is one avenue.. .for pursuing cooperation
vwth foreign authorities.. .There are others.. .We have recently made a number
of requests to foreign governments for assistance [in forming MLATsj.").
129. Id. at 541.
130. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Australia on Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance,
Apr. 27, 1999 (available on file with the Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law).
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deny assistance not only if the request is not in the public interest,
but also if unauthorized by the domestic law of the requested
party. "' It is unclear if "domestic law" includes both procedural
and substantive law. Further, the Agreement makes a broad
statement on disclosure, asserting that no private person will have
any rights to shared information. " Further into the Agreement,
however, there is a provision allowing for disclosure of confidential
information if it is permitted by the requesting party's own law. 133
Thus, it seems a strict rule of confidentiality could not be achieved,
and the party requesting material may have to yield to the
substantive law of the party granting any information.
While the Agreement was being signed, the FTC continued its
attacks on the WTO and its characterization of the IAEAA as a
tool in their cabinet. 13, Commissioner Mozelle Thompson asserted
that there could be no genuine convergence on antitrust law. ".
The WTO's plan to pursue an international code or guidelines,
Thompson argued, is far off and unrealistic. 136
Conflict,
cooperation, and convergence are the three options in
international law enforcement, according to Thompson, and any
combination of the three can occur simultaneously. '"
Despire Thompson's theory, the OECD's traditional
promotion of cooperation through MLATs and the use of the
IAEAA are valuable, but conflict is necessary to enforce U.S.
131.
132.

Id. at Art. IV(A)(3,4).
Id at Art. II(H) (announcing that "[tihe provisions of this Agreement

shall not give rise to a right on the part of any private person to obtain, suppress,
or exclude any evidence.").

133.

Id at Art. VI(B)(5) (stating "[n]othing in this Agreement shall prevent

disclosure, in an action or proceeding brought by an Antitrust Authority of the

Requesting Party for a violation of the antitrust laws of the Requesting Party, of
antitrust evidence provided hereunder to a defendant or respondent in that
action or proceeding, if such disclosure is required by the law of the Requesting

Party."). It should be noted that, presumably, pre-merger information and grand
jury information, which the Agreement does not specifically speak to, cannot be
disclosed.
134. See Thompson on InternationalAntitrust Policy and Convergence Issues,

FTC: Watch No. 518, Mar. 15, 1999.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137.

Id
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standards. " This idea is consistent with the Guidelines, which

state that once power over the subject matter and the parties is
established through the effects doctrine, only then vill comity be
considered. ' Comity, from the U.S. perspective, includes most
importantly whether an MLAT or AMAA could be reached with
another nation. " When extraterritorial action is not possible,
cooperation should be turned to, not vice versa. '4
By early 2000, the new Assistant Attorney General, Joel Klein,
had placed the IAEAA on the same level as the MLATs. ,Z He
cited the unique cases of the MCIAVorldCom and
Dresser/Halliburton mergers, where the parties waived
confidentiality, alloving the U.S. and the European Commission to
share information on the matter freely. " In fact, Klein
emphasized the importance of MLATs over the IAEAA when
stressing the use of positive comity provisions in MLATs with the
EU, Canada, Japan, Israel, and Brazil in recent years, because they
allow a nation to take action under domestic laws. " Instead of

forcing cooperation through set confidentiality standards or
substantive law codes, the DOJ promotes comity and trust in the
138. Id. However, Thompson did note convergence in market definition
guidelines between the EU's "1997 Market Definition Guidelines" and the "1992
Horizontal Merger Guidelines" followed by the DOJ and FTC.
139. See Antitrust Guidelinesfor InternationalOperations- Coudert Brothers,
MONDAQ Bus. BRImEING, Dec. 2, 1998 (discussing the real-world limitations on
extraterritorial application of U.S. enforcement law and how once jurisdiction is
establish, U.S. substantive law applies, whether the case is domestic or
international).
140. Guidelines § 3.2 (stating the U.S. vil take into account "the extent to
which the enforcement activities of another country with respect to the same
persons, including remedies resulting from those activities, may be affected,
and ...the effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. enforcement
action.").
141. Prepared Statement of Joel I. Klein, supranote 4 and accompanying text.
142. See id. (stating that "to help us make effective use of that authority to
protect U.S. markets against conduct taking place abroad, we have negotiated
numerous mutual assistance agreements with our foreign counterparts. One
agreement, negotiated with Australia under the IAEAA...allows us to share
certain confidential information under appropriate protections.").
143. Id.
144. Id. "In all such agreements, the U.S., of course, retains it sovereign right
to undertake antitrust actions under its onm laws."

228

FORDHAMJOURNAL OFCORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW

ability of other nations to handle matters under domestic laws.
The IAEAA, Klein seemed to assert, is one of many tools in
assuring comity. ",
B. IAEAA As Concession TO International Pressure For Change
In a news conference in which Attorney General Janet Reno
announced the introduction of the IAEAA into Congress, then
Assistant Attorney General Bingham revealed some interesting
opinions. ' Initially in the conference, she painted the bill as doing
what subpoenas could not by going across borders. 14 When asked
if the bill would force the DOJ to issue subpoenas on behalf of
foreign nations against Americans on U.S. soil, Bingham balked
and emphasized that the best part of the bill was that it allowed the
U.S. to opt-out of cooperation. ' As she noted, requests under the
IAEAA are made on a case-by-case basis and can be denied at the
DOJ or FTC's discretion. 149 This attitude of "we will get what we
can and move on" forces an examination of international criticism
of the IAEAA as a concession to international demands, and a
look at the effect of the provisions and theory behind the IAEAA.
1. InternationalCriticismAnd Skepticism

The day the IAEAA passed, Japanese officials rebuffed any
idea that they would join into an AMAA with the U.S. ' Their
primary concern was that the policy buttressing the IAEAA was to
enforce U.S. antitrust law against foreign companies competing
145. See Irwin Stelzer, Trust Busters Link Up to Fight Price Fixers, SUNDAY
TIMES (London), Sept. 24,2000 (quoting Klein's comment that America accepted
the EU's lead role in handling the MCI/TeleCom merger because "we had
confidence in the performance and policies of the UK's market-oriented telecom
regulator.").
146. See New Conference with JanetReno, supranote 74.
147. Id. "This bill will enable us to have access to documents we can't reach
today because U.S. subpoenas cannot cross national borders.. .we need it badly
to do the international antitrust for documents..."
148 Id. "We want this bill because we need documents abroad to do our
enforcement. This is not a gift to foreign countries."
149. IAEAA § 8(a)(3) (covering the "public interest" provision).
150. Rice, supranote 5.
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with U.S. exporters, whether or not the activity had a great effect
on the U.S. domestic market. " The idea particularly troubled the
Japanese because of concurrent trade negotiations occurring in
relevant industries. ' In the same year, the Clinton administration
demanded that Japan strengthen its antitrust enforcement while
suggesting trade sanctions. ', The introduction of the Guidelines
only a year later caused Japan even more consternation, given
Japan's desire to maintain a dominant position in the Asian market
from which U.S. competitors had been excluded and the relative
strictness of U.S. substantive law. 1
The EU also questioned the IAEAA. 'u Under article 20 of
Regulation 17 of the EC Treaty, the European Commission can
only use antitrust information acquired in its capacity as a
competition authority for the investigation it was acquired for. " If
the inquiry is into a cartel defined in Article 85 and 86, however, it
could be argued the EC could use its necessary powers under
Regulation 17 to aid the U.S. under an AMAA. L' Unfortunately,
the European Court has ruled that the EC has an overriding duty
to ensure that confidential information remains as such in the
commercial context. ' Because foreign authorities are not even
mentioned in Regulation 17, could be inconsistent to provide the
U.S. with confidential information. ' As a result, the EC balked at
any idea of revising Regulation 17 to allow an AMAA. ,
151. Id.
152. Id. "The U.S. Department of Justice and Trade Representative began
investigating alleged anticompetitive practices in eight sectors of Japanese
industry in September. The sectors are believed to be car parts.. sheet
glass.. .The opening of Japan's glass and motor markets are also the subject of
urgent and none too-friendly trade negotiations."
153. See Robert E. Montgomery, Jr., Tough Antitrust Stance by US. Bad News
for Japan,THE NIi WEEIaA , Dec. 19,1994.
154. Id.
155.

See generally U.S. Antitrust Bill and the EC,Bus. L. EUR.,Sept. 14,1994.

156.

Id.

157.

Id. Articles 85 and 86 provide for supplying information gathered on

cartels to investigations other than the matter for which the evidence was
originally organized for.
158. Id.
159.
160.

Id.
Id "The Commission has show a marked reluctance to contemplate
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European nations are particularly concerned about how the
IAEAA gels with the Guidelines. Some argue the Guidelines
would deny courts a role in factoring in comity to jurisdictional
issues, instead leaving such discretion entirely to the FTC and
DOJ. 161 Some U.S. commentators are worried the Guidelines'
aggressive stance will be viewed as a threat, especially since
jurisdictional matters are to be handled by bureaucratic agencies
and not courts in which challenges can be made. " One
hypothetical in the Guidelines, for instance, allows the U.S.
jurisdiction if more than half the financial risk of the transaction is
born by the U.S. 16 Such a bold stance hurts the chances of there
being any talk of cooperation fostered by the IAEAA. " Further,
the Guidelines go against Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co., where the Supreme Court held that a predatory pricing
conspiracy could not be inferred from cartels raising prices in
foreign markets. " By contrast, the Guidelines, in another
hypothetical, state that the U.S. has jurisdiction over a price fixing
agreement that impairs output and price in the U.S. 1"
The former commissioner of the FTC sharply criticized this
dichotomy. 167 He questioned why someone would want to hail
extraterritorial action through the Guidelines because such actions

revision since it might open up the 32-year-old measure to unwelcome
interference by the Council."
161. See Peter Blackman, InternationalAntitrust: Agencies Take Bold Stand on
Foreign Operations,N.Y.L.J., Nov. 3,1994.
162. Id. "There is a sense among those familiar with the document that it
reflects a general shift in favor of the enforcers and away from the courts in [the]
crafting of antitrust law, according to Richard M. Steur, partner at Kaye, Scholer,
Fierman, Hays &Handler." Id
163. Guidelines, Illustrative Example B
164. Blackmun, supra note 161 (quoting Joseph Griffin, partner in Morgan,
Lewis & Bockius as arguing "[The DOJ and FTC are] trying to say if we confront
a set of extraterritorial conduct, we will talk to the other foreign government
about it, but we reserve the right to go right ahead and prosecute to the fullest
extent of U.S. law .... There is always a threat in the background of any

consultation.").
165. 491 U.S. 1029,1039 (1986).
166. See Guidelines, Illustrative Example C.
167. Calvani, supra note 39.
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violate the rights of other nations. " The Guidelines directly
undermine the goals set forth by the IAEAA and promote a
confusing policy, according to the former commissioner. 1")
The British antitrust enforcement groups recognize this
disparity. ) Many provisions in the Guidelines, especially the
claim that foreclosure of a foreign market has an effect on the U.S.
market and thus is subject to U.S. jurisdiction, are objectionable to
the British as an instrument of trade policy used to open up foreign
markets to U.S. producers. "' More troubling to the British is that
the Guidelines consider the effectiveness of a nation's enforcement
of their domestic antitrust laws against a violator as part of the
FTC and DOJ's analysis of comity. 17 The British government
perceives this as failing to respect the discretion of foreign
enforcement authorities and an inappropriate use of antitrust
power. 17 The U.S. counters that the effects doctrine is now
gaining use internationally; for instance, European competition
laws require that anticompetitive conduct affects trade between
member states in order to be considered a violation. ,' The British
claims that this interpretation ignores the European Court of
Justice's ruling that a valid claim under European law only occurs
when the conduct was implemented within the community. t' As a
result, the contrast between the Guidelines and the IAEAA has
caused uncertainty in the international community, and thus may
slow commerce and growth. ,

168. Id. "Such laws, it might be expected, would be employed sparingly and
only where there was a strong national interest stake that warranted the
compromise of another nation's sovereignty."
169. Id.
170. See UK responds to U.S. Guidelines,BUS. L. EUR., Feb. 15,1995.
171. Id.
172- Id.
173.

Id.

174. See Prepared Statement of Joel I. Kein, supra note 4.
175. Id.
176. Id. "The issue has also sparked fears in the international business
community about the uncertainty and risk of conflicting legal requirements that it
creates, dampening international commerce and investment."
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2. The IncreaseIn The Use Of MLA TS While The 1AEAA Is
Ignored

Three years after the IAEAA passed, not a single AMAA had
been implemented. The Assistant Attorney General Klein turned
his attention to MLATs to aid in information sharing. "
Specifically, he encouraged cartel-only agreements where
substantive antitrust provisions were similar between nations. "
At the same time, Klein noted that even Canada did not yet want
to enter into an AMAA, and that the process for signing these
agreements under the IAEAA was going too slowly. 17
in
particular, he noted that many nations worried that AMAAs would
require them to provide market access information, a trade issue
they argue should have nothing to do with antitrust law. " Other
DOJ officials have noted, however, that if a foreign government or
the U.S. characterized another nation's request under an AMAA
as a trade-based request, it can simply deny the request. "' Other
nations are still concerned with the confidentiality provisions in the
IAEAA, but Klein noted that if their fears cannot be relieved,
MLATs will be entered into. "
The concerns that other nations have are best revealed by
examining the AMAA the U.S. negotiated with Australia.
Confidential evidence shared under that AMAA can be disclosed
once private litigation commences, but until that time, the U.S. and
Australia are under a duty to oppose third-party applications to the

177. See Klein Seeks Cartel-OnlyInternationalAgreements, FTC: Watch, Oct.
27, 1997.
17& Id.
179. See Anticipating the Millennium: InternationalAntitrust Enforcement at
the End of the Twentieth Century, Oct. 16, 1997 speech by Assistant Attorney
General Kelin at the Fordham Corp. L. Inst., FAXline No. 2621.
180. ld.
181. See U.S. Official Chats Up Corporate Lawyers on New International
Antitrust Aid Law, FTC: Watch, Mar. 27, 1995.
182. Prepared Statement of Joel I. Klein, supra note 4 (quoting Klein as
stating "[ilf some of our trading partners have difficulties with full-blown
IAEAA agreements, and given the increasingly serious threat that international
cartels pose to the world economy, we are fully prepared to enter into mutual
assistance agreements that cover only hard-core cartel behavior.").
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fullest extent possible by their respective disclosure laws. "
Europeans might scorn this provision because companies supply
most information voluntarily in EC antitrust proceedings. "4
Anything that diminished this exchange would greatly hamper the
EC's ability to enforce its laws. " Further, the Europeans prefer
MLATs because they usually define whether or not the
information that is shared vill be used for criminal prosecutions or
civil antitrust cases, a distinction which most European nations
laws do not provide for. '
These concerns have led to a proliferation of MLATs while
the IAEAA has been ignored. In 1999, the U.S. signed MLATs
with both Japan and Brazil, with the goal of opening up those
markets to U.S. competition. " The EU and the U.S. entered into
a similar agreement in May of 2000 when they created a merger
task force to establish areas where soft merger harmonization can
be considered while antitrust laws are upheld. " Canada is
considering amending its Competition Act to allow it to enter into
an AMAA, but it is far from the proposal stage due to wrangling
internally over information-sharing safeguards.
3. Problems With Snecifc IAEAA Provivion.v
The confidentiality problem troubling other nations should be
lessened by a broad provision in the IAEAA prohibiting the DOS
or FTC from disclosing any information obtained through an
AMAA. " On the other hand, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b) allows defendants access to any material relevant to the
litigation. 191 Nations might be wary of that information leaking
into the hands of U.S. defendants who are competitors to their
183.
184.
185.
186.

See U.S. and AustraliaAgree on Evidence, Bus. L. EUa., Apr. 30,1997.
1&
Id.
Id.

187.

See Japan, Brazil to Sign U.S. Antitrust Pacts,F1C: Watch, July 26,1999.

188. See U.S.-EU Task Force on Harmonization,FTC: Watch, May 22, 2000.
189. See Don't Rush Canada,ABA Warns, FTC: Watch, Sept. 25,2000.
190. IAEAA § 8(b).
191. See Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 26(b) (stating that discovery is allowed so long as it
is "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.").
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respective nation's companies. "2
At the same time, the IAEAA might not provide enough
confidential information to other nations to be viewed as
worthwhile, particularly in the case the transfer of grand jury
information. " Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e) permits
state attorney generals to obtain grand jury information only if it
may aid in disclosing a crime. "' The rule was amended to this
lower level of proof from the "particularized need" standard set
forth in case law. "' That standard was abandoned. If a U.S.
attorney thought evidence could prove a criminal violation, the
particularized need was thus proven."a Congress found no reason
why a state should have to prove the particularized need a second
time. " Foreign agencies argue they shouldn't have to meet this
outdated standard. "' Because grand jury information is often an
important source of evidence in criminal investigations, "' other
nations believe including it in the IAEAA would make AMAAs
more likely. " Handing over grand jury information is made
difficult by the IAEAA requirement that, at the very least, a level
of protection established by U.S. law for confidential grand jury
information. , This is a protection other nations might not be able
to provide. '
Another problem arises over the provision of the IAEAA
192. Laudati & Friedbacher, supra note 14, at 481-82.
193. See Laurie Freeman, U.S. Canadian Information Sharing and the
InternationalAntitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, 84 GEO. L.J. 339, 346
(1995).
194. Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 6(e).

195. See Illinois v. Abbott & Assoc., Inc., 460 U.S. 557, 558 (1983) (finding
that state attorney generals do not have access to grand jury materials under
FRCP 6(e)).
196. Id
197. H.R. Rep. No. 772, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994).
19& Japan May Resist U.S. Overtures,supranote, 28 at 366.
199. See Nina A. Pala, Comment, GrantJury Disclosurein Antitrust Litigation,
32 CATH. U. L. REv., 437,463 (1983).
200. See Note, Disclosure of Grand Jury Materials to Foreign Authorities
Under the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), 70 VA, L. REV. 1623, 1630

(1984).
201. IAEAA § 12(2).
202. Id.
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allowing information sharing only when foreign antitrust lavs are
substantially similar to U.S. antitrust laws by prohibiting similar
conduct. '
Assistant Attorney General Bingham, during
congressional hearings considering the IAEAA, related the
worthiness of the provision in allowing the U.S. to reject requests
based on foreign laws labeled "antitrust," but actually having no
substantive law judgments. ' In many nations, such as Japan,
there is no mandate for extraterritorial action in prosecuting
foreigners-it can only occur indirectly through the involvement of
a Japanese or other domestic party. '
The IAEAA is also questioned for what it excludes the
treatment of some Fifth Amendment privileged information. '
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Balsy's, ' held that the
Fifth Amendment usually will not permit someone to refuse to
testify merely because he or she fears prosecution in a foreign
country. " That fear, however, could be justified if agreements or
convergence of international law occurred, and the possible future
prosecution would no longer be considered distinctly foreign. "'
The Third Circuit, in In Re: Impounded, found no such connection,
despite the existence of the IAEAA, in part because the
defendants feared no prosecution in Australia. 2'3
Finally, the provision requiring that any request by a foreign
authority must be deemed in the public interest of the U.S. has
203.

Id. § 12(7).

See House Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, Questions
for Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust Anne K. Bingaman Concerning
H.R. 4781, the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994
(Sept. 12,1994), answer to questions 11, 12.
205. YosHIo OHARA, INTERNATIONAL CONTRACrS AND AGREEMENTrs, 5
204.

DOING

Bus.

IN

JAPAN,

SECURITY

TRANSACTIONS,

ANr IMoNOFOLY

REGULATIONS, TAXATION 7.01[i][A I (Zentaro Iitagawa ed. 1997).
206. See Honorable Diane P. Wood, Sympositm: Competing Competition
Laws: Do We Need A GlobalStandard?,34 NEw ENG. L. REV. 103,111 (1999).
207. 524 U.S. 666 (1998).
208. Id. at 671.
209. Id. at 683. "This is not to say that cooperative effort between the United
States and foreign nations could not develop to a point at vwhich a claim could ba
made for recognizing fear of foreign prosecution under the Self-Incrimination
Clause as traditionally understood."
210. See In Re Impounded, 178 F.3d 150,173-74 (3d Cir. 1999).
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many consequences. 211 Indeed, under the principle of reciprocity
set out in section 12(2), both nations in an AMAA may deny a
request if it is inconsistent with their public interest. 22 Thus, even
if antitrust authorities work under similar procedural and
substantive laws, one agency could deny a request because it
disagrees with the degree of enforcement of its counterpart. 213 The
reasons a nation, especially the U.S., would make such denials
relates to possible deficiencies in the formulation of the IAEAA.
4. Problems With The Theory Underlying The IAEAA
Many commentators, discussing the merits of the IAEAA
when it was only legislation, suggested the evidence provided to
the EC under the IAEAA would automatically be disclosed to all
member states, including those who might have proprietary
interests in a company being investigated or a company competing
with the U.S. company being investigated. 214 The public interest
provision has been cited as a way of preventing such an action. 21
Other commentators have argued that the disclosure provision will
be of no worth since its inclusion does not guarantee any real
reciprocity, and thus the IAEAA does not either. 216 In addition,
few nations outside the EU have the commitment to prosecuting

211.

IAEAA § 8(a)(3). "Neither the Attorney General nor the Commission

may conduct an investigation... or provide antitrust evidence to a foreign
antitrust authority... unless... conducting such investigation, applying for such

order, or providing the requested antitrust evidence, as the case may be, is
consistent with the public interest of the United States." Id.
212. Id at §§ 8(a), 12(2).
213. Geralyn Trujillo, Mutual Assistance Under the International Antitrust
Enforcement Assistance Act: Obstacles to a United States-JapaneseAgreement, 33
TEx. INT'L L.J. 613, 619 (1998).
214. See Report of the Section of the Antitrust Law and he Section of
International Law and Practice of the American Bar Association on the

Proposed International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, Aug. 1, 1994, at
20 and n.24; see also case C-36/92P Samenwerkende Elektriciteitsproducktiebedtrijven NV (SEP) v. Europena Commission (1994) ECR 1-1911,

sections 35-37 (holding the EC has been vested with the power to protect
business secrets).
215. Laudati & Friedbacher, supra note 14, at 492-93.
216.

IAEAA § 8(a)(3).
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violators of their antitrust laws who are also firms inside their
nation. '
Further, most nations already have MLATs or
equivalent agreements to share information without a reciprocity
agreement attached. 1 8
The theory behind the IAEAA, given its practical and

philosophical flaws, has been examined earlier in this note. " The
U.S., through the OECD, argues for cooperation in combating
cartels and for individual members of the OECD to adopt similar

regulations to that effect. ' The U.S. also urges these nations to
remove obstacles to sharing information, thus alloAng for
MLATs. 2 Yet, the U.S. vlli continue to assert its right to
extraterritorial action through the Guidelines before any
cooperation as long as cartels and monopolies, such as the ones in
Japan, are perceived as a means to defeat the U.S. economically. '
According to some commentators, the U.S. will continue to argue
for cooperative agreements, as they do at the OECD, because it
does not want any part of harmonization of antitrust law. '
The EU, through the EC, and Japan, continue to push for an
international body of law on various antitrust subjects in order to
move beyond cooperation.
Key EC officials have advocated this
217. See eg., Case 89185, Ahlstrom Oaskeyhito v. Commission, 1938 E.CR.
5193, 4 C.M.L.R. 901 (1988) (discussing a case against a cartel of wood pulp
producers located outside any EU member-state, but which included U.S.
companies).
21& See In re Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1992)
("Congress intended... that 28 U.S.C. § 1782 would provide an avenue for
jurisdictional assistance to foreign to international tribunals whether or not
reciprocal arrangements existed."), cert. denied sub nom.; United Tech. Int'l v.
Malev Hungarian Airlines, 506 U.S. 861 (1992).
219. Wailer supranote 2 and accompanying text.
220. See Neal R. Stoll and Shepard Goldfein, International Cooperation in
Enforcement, N.Y.LJ., June 16,1998.

221.

Id.

222. See Frank Fenton, El Mayor Desafo Comercial De Eu; U.S. Biggest
Trade Challenge, ACERO-NoRTH AM. STEEL J., Nov. 1,1995.
223. See, e.g., Dominic Benicivenga, Bilateral Pacts Seen as Crucial to
Enforcement, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 12, 1996 (quoting A. Paul Victor, partner at Weil,
Gotshal & Manges, arguing that the U.S. wants to avoid being "[hung up on
substantive convergence and what is a violation" by pressing for cooperative
agreements).
224. Wailer, The Internationalizationof Antitrust Enforcement, supra note 1,

238

FORDHAM JOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. VI
FINANCIAL LAW

approach throughout the past decade.

2

To meet these goals, in

June 1996, the EC proposed that the WTO begin developing

international antitrust rules. 2

Some U.S. commentators agree the

time is ripe for such a convergence, at least on the base issues all
industrialized nations can agree on, and especially because existing

bilateral agreements are too narrow in scope for application in
global markets. '
The U.S. refuses to accept convergence because any minimum

international standards might easily become maximum standards.'
Approximately half the WTO membership does not have any
serious competition law or enforcement body, the U.S. asserts,
leading to a fear of the "lowest common denominator"-a weak

set of rules that would compromise our strong body of antitrust
law. ' One commentator posits that the U.S. is using cooperation
as it does extraterritorial action, to block the development of any
international code. 0 The Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Corp.
merger demonstrated that the EC had become a major player in
the trade regulation field whom companies would have to answer
to under one body of law while answering to the U.S. under a very
at 383.
225. See Alex Jacquemin, Towards an Internationalization of Competition
Policy, 18 WORLD EcoN. 781 (1995); Karl Van Miert, EU Competition Policy in
the New Trade Order,Address to the Olso Conference, Competition Policies for
an Integrated World Economy, Oslo, Norway (June 14, 1996).
226. See Commission Press Release, IP(96) 523 (June 18, 1996); European
Commission Will Urge WTO to SpearheadWorld Antitrust Battle, 70 ANTrrRUST

& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) 693 (1996).
227. U.S. and Australia Agree on Evidence, supra note 183 (quoting Eleanor
M. Fox, professor of trade regulation at NYU as stating WTO nations agree on a
principle that there will be "no unreasonable public or private restraints on
market access.").
228. Id. (quoting Assistant Attorney General Klein as stating "[tjoo
frequently, minimum standards become maximum standards... The U.S. has a
100-year history with antitrust law and somehow we wouldn't want to see any set
of minimum standards trump our standards or otherwise undermine them.").
229. Griffin, supra note 15, at 322-23.
230. Bencivenga, supra note 54 (quoting Spencer Weber Waller, associate
dean of Brooklyn Law School: "[t]he U.S. has tried to use extraterritoriality as an
alternative to having a true international antitrust law... Now, the U.S. is
promoting cooperation in enforcement to again block the development of an
international antitrust code.").
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different body of law. "3 The result may be companies answering
to many different antitrust regimes when all the nations involved in
an anticompetitive monopoly assert jurisdiction. ' Ironically,
Klein is concerned that any WTO convergence agreement, such as
an international antitrust court, would interfere with our national
sovereignty through the inappropriate review of witnesses, poor
use of prosecutorial discretion, and the release of confidential
business information. ' He is thus arguing that other nations
should not be allowed to engage in extraterritorial action.,
C Conflicts And Compromise li FinaneialLaw

Unlike antitrust law, a distinct field, financial law, is comprised
of multiple fields. However, vith technological and legislative
innovation prompting companies to seek out non-traditional risks,
the demarcation between the banking and securities industries is
becoming so blurred that fundamental differences soon may no
longer exist. ' In response, groups like the IOSCO and the Basle
Committee have acted to set standards for members to follow in
securities regulation and banking law. " They are standards, not
rules, so as to accommodate national sovereignty during the
process of harmonization. 23 Rules frighten away international
actors due to their rigidity, as opposed to standards which must be
met or not gone beyond. "
For instance, the Basle Committee left enforcement of the
Basle Accord's capital adequacy standards up to member nations

231. Id. (noting the EC's threat to block the merger after the U.S. approved,
resulting in a drastic change in the deal).
232. Id. (quoting Klein as stating "[tihere vlli be times when different
countries v.Ull have different antitrust regimes and I think to the extent more than
one country has jurisdiction, you are going to have to satisfy each of these

countries.").
233. Griffin, supra note 15, at 323.
234. Id.
235. See Joseph L. Norton, The Glass.Steagall Act and Related Bank
LegislativeReform in the United States, 14 B.F.L.R. 1-42 (1998).
236. Jayasuriya, supranote 22, at 451.
237. Id
23& Id
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and their agencies. " Thus, enforcement of standards are left to
these agencies and not to a supernational authority or any single
nation. 2o The IOSCO operates in the same way when regulating
securities, laying down standards and monitoring compliance
without enforcement. " Some authors posit that this system of
decentralized enforcement is the new regulatory model in various
areas, not only financial law, but also environmental and
intellectual property law. 2 The international body passing these
regulations need only monitor member compliance rather than
directly enforce standards. ,
One author calls this trend,
developing in most major fields aside from antitrust law, a system
of network governance providing broad standards and relying
largely on national agencies for compliance. 2
On the other hand, regulation of insider trading has produced
similar results to antitrust proposals. The choice of when to apply
insider trading law and to what extent is largely left to the nation
making the claim of a violation of its particular laws. 25, The debate
has thus involved how to make that choice, with the SEC
emphasizing the site of the fraud and at least one author
recommending the location of the domestic issuer. 24 The same
author argues there may be another approach: to allow a nation to
rent out its regulations, permitting a foreign nation to commit to
the first nation's laws to reap the benefit of more stringent insider
trading regulation. 247 Yet, even this author recognizes that each
solution is only a intermediate one, especially since nations will be
reluctant to use their scarce resources to aggressively regulate
insider trading when going after multinational corporations

239.

Id.

240. Id
241. Id
242. Id.
243. See generally Abram Chayes & Anotonia Handler Chayes, On
Compliance,47 INT'L ORG. 175 (1993).
244. Jayasuriya, supra note 22, at 453.
245. See Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, PortableReciprocity: Rethinking
the InternationalReach of SecuritiesRegulation, 71 SO. CAL. L. REv. 903 (1998).
246. See Langevoort, supra note 92.
247. Id.
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without strong domestic connections to that nation. " The viable
alternative, according to some, would be an international
organization like the IOSCO with full criminal and civil power.
Without such a group as the ultimate goal, as in antitrust law,
instances of cross-border insider trading vll increase without a
corresponding increase in global enforcement to meet the tide
head-on. '
Despite the MJDS and similar EC agreements (but only within
that body), moves toward global disclosure harmonization have
been slow. ' One author recommends the IOSCO continue
proposing a international disclosure document for use in both
domestic and international offerings. ' The SEC has been
criticized for what some call an arbitrary and stringent
determination to stick vth U.S. disclosure mandates. ' Given that
the SEC has the leverage to negotiate standards to its liking on the
international scale, and given the increasing multinational nature
of transactions, it might in the SEC's best interests to relax those
demands. ' In fact, in an International Equity Offers report by the
IOSCO, the group recommended harmonization not only through
a single international disclosure document, but also through
reciprocity or cooperation between twvo or more nations. "s
Financial opportunities emerging from recent technological
innovations create the potential for financial institutions to
accumulate significant losses over short periods of time. " The
linkages across financial markets and volatility of capital flows
creates the potential for disturbances such as the East Asian
248.

Id. The author notes the obstacles to a strict international policing of

insider trading that the U.S. and its companies would like.
249. Id.; see also Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities

Commission, 38 COLM. J. TRANs. L. 9 (1999).
250. Id.
251. Steinberg & Michaels, supranote 24 and accompanying text.
252 Id.
253.

See generally Bevis Longstrth, A Loot. at the SEC's Adaptationto Global

Market Pressures,33 COLuM. J. TRANs. L. 319 (1995).
254. Id.
255. See International Equity Offers, Report on the Technical Committee of
IOSCO 7 (Sept. 1989) (manuscript on file vith the IOSCO).
256. Norton, supranote 1S at 141.
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Financial Crises of 1997-1998, which gravely effect other
institutional groups and markets. ' This contagin effect can only
be met by a corresponding international body or set of standards.'8
Indeed, regulators are currently playing catch-up to market
developments spurred on by financial innovations, affecting both
financial and antitrust law. "'
III. THE JAEAA CAN ONLY SUCCEED IF HARMONIZATION BEGINS
As IT HAS IN THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REALM

The extraterritorial approach to antitrust and financial law is
hypocritical in practice. The U.S. can force other nations to sit idly
by while it plucks foreign citizens and evidence from their
boundaries. ' If another nation dares to exert the same type of
procedural authority, the U.S. will scream national sovereignty. 61
Supporting this reaction is, in part, the rationale that because U.S.
substantive law antitrust law arrived on the scene first, it must have
prominence internationally. ' But a more important reason may
be that Congress and the U.S. business community are determined
to protect our international trade policy regardless of what would
prove to be a just international antitrust policy. 26 The courts have
wavered in their support of the extraterritorial approach, resulting
in opinions favoring comity and discounting Alcoa's effects test, 264
such as Timberlane ' and Zenith Radio, ' while supporting the
FTC and DOJ in HartfordFire 7 in a 5-4 Supreme Court decision.
Foreign nations, particularly our main trade competitors in the
EU and Japan, have recognized the U.S.'s stance and have
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attempted to produce gains on the other side of the spectrum,
harmonization/convergence. : Any sweeping set of international
standards surely would be to the benefit of these nations by
actually becoming minimum standards for the U.S. ' Even
European and Japanese antitrust law is not well developed, and
any broad international code would tie the hands of U.S. regulators
while freeing up numerous practices that would be illegal to U.S.
firms practicing on U.S. soil. ' These nations have equally strong
interests in protecting their trade policies, especially against the
current U.S. market dominance. Any notion that they are urging
harmonization solely for the sake of justice would be naive.
But harmonization may be necessary to meet the unnerving
speed of technological innovation and the opportunities for
securities fraud and antitrust violation that brings. " Cartels are
expanding across borders in the same way financial markets are
overlapping. Consistency is the key. In order for investors and
companies to have confidence in any market, there must be
consistent regulation of similar financial services and activities of
banks and firms, just as there must be consistent antitrust
procedures and substantive law. Cooperative information-sharing
agreements are a first step, but without the goal of consistency
through harmonization in mind, such agreements ignore the longrange needs of the global economy. The Basle Committee
recognized those needs by consolidating supervision and the lucid
division of responsibilities between any supervisors for crossborder banking. m Such an urgency has not yet been felt by the
U.S. in antitrust law.
At first blush, the current form of cooperation provides a
valuable solution for antitrust disputes. MLATs and MOUs
continue to be successful weapons in international prosecutions.
Indeed, the DOJ continued to aggressively seek out MLATs while
acknowledging the IAEAA ineffectiveness to date. ' But their
268.
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effectiveness is limited by the U.S.'s strict Guidelines that preempt
any considerations of comity. ' Differences in confidentiality and
disclosure rules result in limited international use of such
arrangements. '
Using the IAEAA would be the next logical step.
Unfortunately, it was implemented without a necessary minimal
harmonization of international antitrust law in place. Key to such
a harmonization beginning, remembering that complete
convergence sometimes proposed by the WTO is wasteful and
unrealistic, is agreement on procedural standards. If the U.S.
would revised the effects doctrine to respect comity before
extraterritoriality, whether in case law or through revisions of the
Guidelines, Japan and many European nations would now have
procedural antitrust laws that mesh with the U.S. Only then can
two nations discussing an AMAA even examine whether their
substantive laws are substantially similar. Currently, nations
ignore the use of the IAEAA because they know that even if their
substantive laws fulfill this requirement, the U.S. can join in an
AMAA and share information while reserving the right to use
extraterritorial action whenever it chooses. 26 Why would a nation
whose companies are in direct trade competition agree to these
ground rules?
In direct contrast is the development of international securities
regulation. The IOSCO emerged as the forum for international
cooperation and information sharing amongst regulators.'m
IOSCO recommendations on regulatory standards, cooperation,
and reciprocity have resulted in MOUs which have harmonization
as their goal. " Development of standards is necessary in the face
of the contagin effect, whereby the collapse of one market can
have drastic effects on all the rest. '
In the same way,
underdeveloped nations may and often join together to form
cartels to gain access and control of emerging markets. Their
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influence can have a contagin effect on other markets as access
disappears and efficiency falters. Unfortunately, no tool is in place
to promote such an effective antitrust policy.
Which brings the debate back to another procedural area that
must be resolved before the IAEAA can be effective:
confidentiality. If the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow
defendants all evidence material to the litigation, there is no way,
short of amending those rules, that the U.S. can claim to keep that
information from being disclosed. ' The only answer is to expand
the amount of information available through an AMAA to include
grand jury testimony and pre-merger notifications. Grand jury
information is already supplied to state attorney generals under the
low-level, "disclosing of a crime" standard. " U.S. companies
ardently protested including pre-merger notifications in the
IAEAA, but without this information there may be no reason for a
nation to engage in an AMAA.
The reason such information was left out is similar to including
the "public interest" provision in the IAEAA. It violates the
concept of reciprocity that the IAEAA was supposed to champion.
The FTC and DOJ can discount a request simply because they feel
its motivation is based on a nation's trade policy. If one of the
agencies deny the request on those grounds, the slighted party
would deny future U.S. requests on the same ground, and many
times they would be correct. The theory these points were based
on, reciprocity for only short-term use, ignores the strides the U.S.
has made in financial law, particularly in disclosure through the
MJDS, toward using disclosure to harmonize conflicting standards.
If some base procedural and substantive harmonization does
not occur, the IAEAA will remain useless save to nations like
Australia and Canada who are not real trade rivals to the U.S. and
not major players in the expanding economy. The U.S. may well
have been using the IAEAA as a concession to block the
formation of a strict international code with "minimum" standards.
However, in the area of financial law, the U.S. has agreed to the
establishment of minimum standards in regulating financial
institutions, a step even the U.S. viewed as essential to strengthen
280.
281.

See IAEAA § 5(1).
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the confidence and integrity in the international financial system.
The U.S.'s OECD proposal for convergence on some cartel
rules is a step in the right direction.' The U.S. reluctance to pursue
insider trading standards in the IOSCO is not. U.S. regulators
pursue harmonization, whether it be in securities regulation or
banking, when it benefits the nation, but discounts it when
harmonization hurts our local economy, as in antitrust or insider
trading. This contradictory policy fails to understand the growth of
a global economy where all markets are interconnected.
International cooperation is intensifying in most financial law
areas, but not in antitrust law. Since the progress in financial law
may just be a game of catch-up to market innovations, the U.S.
reluctance to move on antitrust law is dangerous for its economy.
CONCLUSION

The FTC and DOJ need to reject the extraterritorial approach
articulated in the Guidelines and shakily upheld in the courts. It is
a doctrine created in the early 1940s when our economy was in
shambles and needed protection from companies whose nations
had virtually no substantive antitrust laws. The doctrine ignores
the internationalization of markets and the decrease in importance
of boundaries over the past 60 years. The result will be even more
cases like the Boeing-McDonnell Douglas Corp. merger where
companies face competing nations whose interests they must
satisfy. This will hamper smooth transitions in mergers and the
ability of other companies accused of being monopolists or part of
a cartel from competing efficiently in the global market. Some
agreement must be made in substantive and procedural areas of
antitrust law to allow for joint prosecutions of violators whose ill
effects reach across boundaries. The same reasoning for U.S.
participation in the Basle Committee and the IOSCO must be
applied to antitrust law. Until that time, the IAEAA will remain
an ineffective trade policy ploy, and the economy will suffer the
consequences.
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